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osting by EAbstract Positive Train Control (PTC) systems can eliminate the consequences of collision or
derailment. However, prior to the full-scale deployment of these systems, the Federal Government
must conduct a regulatory review and approve the risk analysis of the PTC system performance.
The objective of this review is to ensure that the operating environment after installation of the
PTC system is at least as safe as the operating environment before the system installation. This
paper is intended to provide researchers an understanding of PTC, the reason for its use, the reg-
ulatory requirements for the required comparative risk analysis of the PTC system, the critical fail-
ure modes that the comparative analysis must address, and future work that would facilitate the risk
assessment process.
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lsevier1. Introduction
Rail operations are ubiquitous throughout the United States.
They operate in every state in the US except Hawaii, across
a network that exceeds 140,000 miles (BTS, 2003). The 559
freight railroads move over 1.7 trillion ton miles of freight
(AAR, 2007). The 22 commuter railroads alone move 1.4 mil-
lion people daily (APTA, 2007) and the Amtrak intercity pas-
senger service adds over 75,000 more (BTS, 2008).
Failures in existing methods of rail operations can have cat-
astrophic consequences. On September 13, 2008, for example,
a safety violation known as a ‘‘Signal Passed at Danger
(SPAD)’’ resulted in a collision between a Union Paciﬁc freight
train and a METROLINK commuter train, which occurred in
Chatsworth, California (Melago, 2008). This collision resulted
in the death of 26 people and injuries to 135 more. Another
SPAD in Macadona, Texas in June 2004 resulted in 3 deaths
and 30 injured when a BNSF freight train and a Union Paciﬁc
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correctly line a switch in January 2005 in Graniteville, South
Carolina resulted in a collision between two Norfolk Southern
freight trains. The collision and subsequent release of chlorine
gas caused the death of 9 people, injury to an additional 554,
and the evacuation of 5400 for a period of 2 weeks (NTSB,
2005). All of these accidents, and the associated casualties,
could have been prevented had a Positive Train Control
(PTC) system been installed and operational.
Prior to a US railroad installing and operating a PTC sys-
tem, the railroad must receive regulatory approval from the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the USDepartment
of Transportation (DOT). As part of that approval process, the
PTC system must undergo a comprehensive risk analysis of its
failure modes. The regulatory review and approval process is
complicated by the fact that there is no formal speciﬁcation
of the failure modes that must be addressed in the risk analysis.
Consequently each individual railroad speciﬁes its own failure
modes, and in the process may not address the critical issues
of regulatory concern, or may address them in such a manner
that is not clearly understood by the regulatory agency. In
either case, the regulatory review process is extended in order
to resolve these misunderstanding, adding both to the cost of
the system approval process, as well as delaying the implemen-
tation of systems. This paper proposes an open common spec-
iﬁcation of critical failure modes that must be addressed when
preparing the required failure analysis for regulatory review.
Not only does it aid in preparing the required failure analysis,
but also provides a mechanism for allowing the regulator to
more effectively evaluate the risks associated with different pro-
posed PTC system implementations.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we will discuss
current methods of rail operations, and their limitations, to
establish a context for the development of PTC systems. Sec-
tion 3 will discuss PTC systems, their functionality, and how
it can augment or replace existing methods of operation. Sec-
tion 4 will discuss the regulatory framework in which PTC sys-
tems are installed. Section 5 discusses related work as well as
the proposed general failure mode model associated with
PTC, which can adversely affect system safety in terms of
Functional Fault Trees (FFT). Finally, Section 6 summarizes
the preceding chapters and outlines future work we believe
necessary to relate an FFT to the more natural language Use
and Misuse Case descriptions of system behavior and failure
modes.
2. Existing methods of operations and limitations
Existing methods of operations for the control of trains can be
classiﬁed into four basic categories:
 verbal authority,
 mandatory directives,
 signal indications, and
 signal indications supplemented by cab signals, automatic
train control, or automatic train stop systems.
When using verbal authority and mandatory directives, the
aspects of wayside signals along the railroad do not control
train operations. Instead, train operations are controlled by or-
ders from the Train Dispatcher, who takes responsibility for
knowing what trains are located where, and ensures that notwo trains are issued authority to occupy the same location
of track at the same time. The Dispatcher usually issues orders,
mandatory directives, speed restrictions, as well as the location
of any wayside work crew via two-way radio to the locomotive
crew. The train crew are responsible for ensuring that they
obey these orders, speed restrictions, and advisories. This is
the traditional means of controlling operations in the United
States, and roughly 40% of all tracks in the United States
are controlled in this manner.
Train operations under signal indications constitute the
remainder of the train control operations in the US. Track cir-
cuit based signal systems were ﬁrst installed in the US in 1872,
and by 1927 they were centrally controlled in the ﬁrst ‘‘Central-
ized Trafﬁc Control (CTC)’’ system and have remained basi-
cally unchanged since the 1930s. In CTC, authority for train
movements is provided by signal indications. The train dis-
patcher at the control center determines train routes and prior-
ities, and then remotely operates switches and signals to direct
the movement of trains. Some CTC systems have been en-
hanced to provide direct indications of wayside signal aspects
to the locomotive engineer inside the locomotive cab. Signal
aspect is the appearance of the signal, as opposed to a signal
indication, which is the information conveyed by the appear-
ance of the signal. Further reﬁnements called ‘‘Automatic Train
Stop (ATS)’’ or ‘‘Automatic Train Control (ATC)’’ automati-
cally cause the train to stop or reduce speed where an engineer
fails to acknowledge a wayside signal.
Cab signals simply relay the external signal indications to a
visual display inside the cab of the locomotive, making it easier
for the crew to note the signal aspect and the associated order
it conveys. Unless operated with ATS or ATC, the cab signal
systems do not provide speed or authority enforcement. This
approach has several signiﬁcant technical limitations. First,
the location of trains can only be determined by the resolution
of a track circuit. If any part of a track circuit is occupied, that
entire track circuit must be assumed as occupied. The track cir-
cuit’s length can be made shorter, but adding additional track
circuits requires additional wayside hardware. This imposes
additional costs, causing a practical (and economical) limit
to the number of track circuits that a railroad can install. Sec-
ond, the information that can be provided to a train through a
rail-based system is limited to a small number of wayside signal
aspects or speed data.
In addition, the underlying signal systems to provide the
required indications for cab, ATS, or ATC to operate are
capital intensive. In 2003, the Class 1 railroads alone spent
over $490 million in operation, administration, and mainte-
nance of all types of communications and signaling systems
with another $153 million in deprecation of the existing plant
on approximately 65,000 miles of track ( HR, 2003; STB,
2003). Consequently the deployment of these technologies is
limited to those areas where rail throughput needs to be max-
imized. Less than 5% of route-miles in the US have systems
in place, where signal indications are shown in the locomotive
cab, on-board enforcement of the signal indications, or both
(BTS, 2003).
At best, these traditional methods of train control provide
for reactive enforcement of unauthorized train movements
after a movement violation has occurred. The inability of
cab signals, ATS, and ATC to effectively incorporate collision
and accident avoidance measures with the current methods of
operations has been the primary motivation for the US




1 Prevent train to train collision
Enforce speed restrictionsÆ
Protect roadway workers
2 PTC Level 1 + digital transmission of
authorities and train information
3 PTC Level 2 + wayside monitoring of
the status of all switch, signal, and
protective devices in traﬃc control
territory
4 PTC Level 3 + wayside monitoring of all
mainline switches, signals, and protective
devices
Positive Train Control (PTC) failure modes 313National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to ask for PTC
(NTSB, 2007).
3. Positive Train Control
PTC does not refer to a particular technology, but any num-
ber of possible technologies that provide certain functional
behaviors ( FRA, 1999a). The common functional require-
ments, known as PTC Level 1, are:
 prevention of train-to-train collisions, referred to as positive
train separation,
 enforcement of speed restrictions (including civil engineer-
ing restrictions and temporary slow orders), and
 protection of roadway workers and their equipment operat-
ing under speciﬁc authorities
PTC Level 1 can be augmented with additional functionality.
The additional functionality added is referred to as PTC Levels
2, 3, or 4. Each level is cumulative as shown in Table 1.
PTC systems that provide various functionalities are com-
plex systems in nature and are made up of widely distributed
physical, but closely coupled, functional sub-systems. All PTC
systems are derivations of a single basic functional architecture,
with speciﬁc enhancements and modiﬁcations to both functions
and modes of operations to support the unique requirements
and operational needs of the individual procuring railroads.
The basic characteristics of a PTC system (FRA, 1999b) are:
 high precision determination of train location independent
of track circuits,
 continuous train-to-wayside and wayside-to-train high
bandwidth RF data communications network to permit
the transfer of control and status information and,
 wayside and train borne processors to process received train
status and control data and provide continuous train con-
trol as required.
PTC offers signiﬁcant operational advantages, such as more
effective utilization of the track wayside infrastructure,
improved reliability and reductions in maintenance costs
through a signiﬁcant reduction in the amount of wayside
equipment, and the extension of signal operations in non-sig-
nalized territory.
The three major functional sub-systems of a PTC system
(Hartong et al., 2006a) are the wayside subsystem, the mobile
onboard, and the dispatch/control subsystem. These sub-sys-
tems communicate with each other over a variety of communi-
cation links. The wayside subsystem consists of elements, such
as highway grade crossing signals, switches and interlocks or
maintenance workers. The mobile subsystem consists of loco-
motives or others on rail equipment, with their onboard com-
puter and location systems. The dispatch/control unit is the
central ofﬁce that runs the railroad. Each functional subsystem
is implemented using various databases, data communication
systems, and information processing equipment.
4. Regulatory framework
The regulatory framework governing PTC is complex, and
varies depending on whether the PTC installation is deemeda mandatory or voluntary installation by the FRA. Two differ-
ent, but complementary, sets of regulations exist for each type
of installation. Both consist of amendments by the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) of the US Department of
Transportation (DOT) to the ‘‘Rules, Standards and Instruc-
tions (RS&I) (GPO, 2009a) for railroad signal and train con-
trol systems. PTC installations that are not mandated for
installation are governed by 49 CFR 236 Subpart H. These
regulations became effective since June 6, 2005 and are known
as the ‘‘Standards for Development and Use of Processor-
Based Signal and Train Control Systems’’ (GPO, 2009b).
Prior to the development of the Subpart H regulations,
FRA and the rail industry had recognized that advances in
technology in signal and train control systems had overtaken
the existing prescriptive signal and train control regulations,
and that changes were needed. The advanced technologies
coming into use had not been foreseen when the original
RS&I had been developed, and consequently these new tech-
nologies were being regulated on a case-by-case basis. This
caused confusion as to the correct regulatory requirements
for the various systems.
The Subpart H regulations eliminate this confusion. They
specify an implementation-independent method of promoting
the safe operation of trains on railroads that use processor-
based signal and train control equipment. These regulations
are a performance-based standard with only two simple criteria:
First, the new system must be at least as safe as what it replaces.
Second, the implementer is responsible for demonstrating the
safety claims of the new system. Thus any safety analysis pro-
vided must demonstrate this.
The Subpart H regulations are technology neutral, so the
railroad is free to pick the implementation technology best
suited to their requirements. Since the regulations are
performance and risk-based, the railroads and their vendors
may customize a technology solution to best ﬁt their individual
business cases. In short, this framework opens the potential for
increased innovations by removing prescriptive design and tech-
nological limitations. These are reﬂected in the implementations
of the basic architectural and functional requirements.
In addition to classiﬁcation by functionality, PTC systems
are also classiﬁed by the extent that they are used to augment
the exiting methods of railroad operations. Since the approval
criteria are based on the demonstrating that the replacement
314 M. Hartong et al.system is at least as safe as the old system, it is necessary to
understand if the PTC system is overlaying or replacing the
currently installed system. Full PTC systems completely
change or replace existing method of operations. Overlay
PTC systems act strictly as a backup to existing method of
operations where the existing method of operations remains
unchanged. This classiﬁcation scheme also provides an exam-
ple of the ﬂexibility for both regulators and regulated entities
with respect to enforcement and compliance issues.
The intent of Subpart H regulations also adopts a more
pragmatic approach to evaluating risk. Absolute perfection is
unrealistic and unobtainable. Even if it were technically feasi-
ble to determine all failure modes, the economics of engineer-
ing such a system would preclude its deployment. Failure to
deploy a system, in turn, may result in a decrease, or loss of
safety. Instead the regulation requires the presentation of a
valid and demonstrable argument that a system is adequately
safe for a given application and operational environment over
the lifetime of the system. This means that the risks of product
operation have been analyzed, assessed, and mitigated where
necessary and a mechanism has been created to ensure that
the risk mitigation controls are effective. The only limitation
of the regulation is that compliance is voluntary. While the
regulations provide requirements that a PTC system must
meet if it is installed, it did not require the installation of
PTC systems. Although the major railroads were deploying
PTC systems, the extremely high cost of doing so relative to
the accrued safety beneﬁts resulted in very limited
deployment.
As an outgrowth of the head end collision at Chatsworth, Cal-
iforniaduringSeptember 2008, theCongressmade apublic policy
decision inOctober of 2008 that gave FRAauthorization toman-
date the installation of PTC systems in the Rail Safety Improve-
mentAct of 2008 (RSIA08) (GPO, 2008). This statutorymandate
extends the Level 1 functionality of PTC to include prevention of
themovement of trains through switches that are left in thewrong
position. It also requires that Class 1 railroads, railroads offering
intercity passenger service, and commuter railroads install PTC
systems on high-risk lines by December 31, 2015. High-risk lines
refer to tracks owned byClass 1 railroads, which carrymore than
5 million gross tons of freight per year or toxic by inhalation
materials, or any track which carries passengers, regardless of
the railroad class.
Given this new statutory mandate, and the aggressive time
frame required for completion, the FRA made the decision
that a slightly more prescriptive regulatory approach than that
provided for in Subpart H was appropriate and began the
development of a new 49 CFR 236 Subpart I (GPO, 2010).
Subpart I maintains the best features of Subpart H, while
allowing for greater reuse of information between railroads
that is necessary to demonstrate the safety of the PTC systems
and supporting two new critical requirements demanded by the
Congress. The ﬁrst is that FRA certiﬁes that mandatory re-
quired PTC systems fulﬁll the statutory requirements. The sec-
ond is that railroads submit to FRA a risk based prioritized
plan for implementing PTC that ensures interoperability with
PTC systems installed by other railroads by April 2010. As
with Subpart H installations, Subpart I allows railroads to se-
lect the technology that best supports their individual business
cases, and maintains the technology neutral pragmatic ap-
proach that absolute risk elimination is neither practical nor
obtainable.Subpart H and Subpart I share a common requirement for
the submission of a risk analysis of the PTC system being
implemented. Both also share a common set of failure modes
that must be clearly outlined in order to properly complete
the risk analysis.
5. PTC system safety
Like traditional signal systems, PTC systems are designed with
the goal of fail-safe operation, even when communications are
lost. Unlike traditional signal systems, there is leeway allowed
regarding the extent that ﬁrst and second order safety func-
tionalities are required to be directly associated with the term
Overlay. First order safety functionalities are mandatory to
ensure safe system operation. Their loss would potentially re-
sult in unsafe system operations. Second order safety function-
alities are those used in conjunction with another function to
ensure safe system operation. Loss of a single second order
function will not result in an inability to continue with safe
system operations, unless coupled with the loss of an
additional second order function.
A Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) is an example of the
consequences of the ﬁrst and second order failure. In all cases,
the train crew are required to comply with their operating
rules. One of these rules is that the conductor and the engineer
‘‘call the signal’’ as a safety check. Both people must call the
same signal, else the conductor or engineer is expected to slow
and stop the train until the discrepancy is resolved. Failure of a
crew to call the signal could be considered as a ﬁrst order fail-
ure, because it could potentially result in unsafe system opera-
tions. However, failure to call the signal does not necessarily
result in the train exceeding the limits of its authority. A sec-
ond failure, for example the failure of the crew to apply sufﬁ-
cient brake, is required. Individually these two failures will not
necessarily result in an SPAD, but when taken together they
result in the occurrence of an unsafe condition.
5.1. Safety cases under Subpart H
In Subpart H the safety case of a PTC system is documented in
two separate documents created by the railroads and their ven-
dors, both of which require review and approval by the gov-
ernment. The ﬁrst, called the Railroad Safety Program Plan
(RSPP), spells out how the railroad plans to address the safety
and risk analysis, safety veriﬁcation and validation, human
factors, and conﬁguration management. The second is the
Product Safety Plan (PSP).
The PSP is the detailed safety analysis for an individual
product. It provides a detailed description of the particular
product, its concept of operations, the results of the risk
analysis done for the product, veriﬁcation and validation of
the product safety, the human factors analysis of the
man–machine interface, required user training, maintenance
and repair requirements, and security requirements. Approval
of the PSP is based on the extent that recognized standards
have been used in the product design, the complexity of the
product, its deviation from past design practices associated
with existing traditional signal and train control systems, the
degree of rigor and precision of the safety analysis, the extent
of the veriﬁcation and validation, how identiﬁed faults are ad-
dressed, and how the risk analysis compares to the previous
case.
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The safety case of a PTC system under the proposed Subpart I
also requires the submission of two documents and approval
by the FRA. The ﬁrst of these is the PTC Development Plan
(PTCDP). Submitted by a single railroad or a consortium of
railroads, the PTCDP contains a detailed description of a par-
ticular product, its design, and its proposed operating environ-
ment. After review and approval of the PTCDP by the FRA,
the FRA assigns a Type Approval. The Type Approval is a
formal determination by the FRA that the product, if built
and operated as described in the PTCDP, will fulﬁll the statu-
tory requirements. Once issued, any other railroad may elect to
implement the system as described in the Type Approval with-
out resubmission of any of the information associated with the
PTCDP. If the railroad elects to implement a variant of the
system described in the Type Approval, the railroad may sub-
mit an abbreviated PTCDP which references the appropriate
Type Approval and describes in detail extensions or changes
from the type approved system. The second required document
is the PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP). The PTCSP is the railroad
speciﬁc safety analysis of the as-built system implemented in
railroads operating environment.
When combined, the information associated with the
PTCDP and the PTCSP is equivalent to that presented by a
railroad in a PSP submitted under Subpart H. FRA uses the
same general criteria used for approval of the PTCDP and
PTCSP as used in Subpart H for approval of the PSP. This
equivalence is by design – it enables both FRA and the rail-
roads to use the experience gained in formulating and review-
ing a PSP under Subpart H to be applied to the formulation
and review of ﬁlings under Subpart I. Approval of the PTCSP
by FRA acts as the system certiﬁcation required under the
RSIA08.
The proposed Subpart I does not require the creation, sub-
mission, and approval of a Railroad Safety Program Plan. In
crafting Subpart I, FRA promulgates for the railroad the man-
ner in which it is to address the safety and risk analysis, safety
veriﬁcation and validation, human factors, and conﬁguration
management based on the type of system (non-vital overlay,
vital overlay, standalone, or mixed) and the speed at which rail
operations will be conducted. The elimination of the require-
ment of an RSPP, and the introduction of the type approval,
reduce the regulatory burden on the railroad and shorten the
system approval process.
5.3. Previous work in the deﬁnition of PTC failure modes
To the author’s best knowledge, this work is unique in that it is
speciﬁcally oriented towards specifying taxonomy of PTC sys-
tem failures. The open literature that discusses PTC failure
modes is quite limited. This is not entirely unexpected. The
engineering effort associated with failure modes analysis on
complex systems, such as PTC is signiﬁcant and represents a
signiﬁcant cost to the system developer. Open disclosure of
the failure mode analysis could allow other suppliers to lever-
age their engineering effort off the information disclosed,
thereby reducing their development costs and gaining a corre-
sponding competitive advantage in the market place. Likewise,
in a litigious society such as the US, open voluntary disclosure
of failure mode information may place the supplier at risk
from expensive litigation by providing the plaintiff informa-tion that they try use against supplier. Even US federal regula-
tory bodies responsible for safety oversight have found it
necessary to resort to the threat of formal subpoenas at times
to obtain failure mode information.
Recent literature that is available remains oriented primar-
ily towards Automatic Train Control and Protection Systems,
and the discussion of system failure modes is secondary to
other objectives. Lawson (2007), for example, discusses some
failure modes when describing an Automatic Train Control
system in use in Sweden. Evans and Verlander (1996) provide
some discussion of possible failure in the case of automatic
train protection but this is secondary to a methodology for
projecting the number of injuries and fatalities in the event
of an accident. In Gheorghe et al. (2005), some failure modes
are discussed, however, their primary objective of the work is
to describe the construct of a possible decision support tool
for accident evaluation. Monfaclone et al. (2001) identify some
possible train control system failure modes, but for Direct
Trafﬁc Control Systems, and in the context of a probabilistic
modeling tool called ASCAP. Similar situations exist with
Braband (1997), Brabrand and Renpenning (2001), Noffsinger
et al. (1999), Jo and Hwang (2007), Yang et al. (2010),
Mokkapatia (2004) and Jo et al. (2007). Zhao et al. (2009)
discuss failures associated with the communication subsystem
of Communications Based Train Control System in the
context of demonstrating a safety analysis approach.
Chabanon (2005) also discusses some failure modes of CBTC
systems, but in the context of commissioning tests of PTC sys-
tems. Even Jackson (2005), which speciﬁcally addresses CBTC
and PTC systems, concentrates on the risk evaluation process
as opposed to the identiﬁcation of the actual failure modes.
5.4. Failure mode model
The safety critical failure modes the PTC system design must
address are the same regardless of the regulatory approach it
is qualiﬁed under. Traditionally, Functional Faults Trees
(FFT) have been used in the safety critical design to specify
and analyze potential faults in a system’s functional architec-
ture, which may result in system failure. Structured FFT Anal-
ysis (Vesely et al., 1981) deﬁnes event relationships resulting in
a failure using Boolean algebra. By simplifying such Boolean
algebra expressions, these events can be expressed as combina-
tions of basic faults that result in the system failure so that
their removal can result in a system that is devoid of known
modes of failure. By associating the estimation of the probabil-
ities of various failure modes the aggregate probability of fail-
ure of a system can be determined. A more detailed example of
this process for a PTC system can be found in Hartong et al.
(2006b). The use of FFT’s in this manner is not without
precedence. Katsumata et al. (2000) utilize a similar fault Tree
Analytical approach, but for an Automatic Train Protection
system.
Failures of a PTC system that can result in unsafe train
operations can be divided into two basic categories: Train
Derailment and Train Collisions, Train Derailment hazards
are all failures that result in the train, or any part of the
train, leaving the tracks. Train Collision hazards are all fail-
ures that result in a train colliding with another object.
Both these categories consist of implementation indepen-
dent, and implementation speciﬁc, failures. Speciﬁcation of
implementation speciﬁc failures requires knowledge of the
Figure 1 Generic positive train control system architecture.
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associated with implementation speciﬁc failures are usually
proprietary intellectual property of the system manufacturer,
and are not generally made available to the public. As a
consequence, we will only address implementation indepen-
dent failures (Fig. 1).
5.4.1. Train derailments
Causes of train derailments can be partitioned into four sub-
categories (Fig. 2). The ﬁrst of these are infrastructure failures.
Infrastructure failures are a consequence of track failures, such
as broken rails, excessive increases in the super elevation of the
track or changes in track gauge. Because detection and report-
ing of these types of infrastructure failures are not functional
capabilities of PTC Level 1 system (or Level 1 enhanced with
switch position monitoring) we will not further develop their
underlying causes.Figure 2 Top level deraThe second category is traversal of a switch incorrectly
aligned for the train movement (Fig. 3). Three different condi-
tions can cause this hazard. The ﬁrst is the movement of the
switch after the train has passed the safe stopping distance
(SSD) to the switch. The second is that the train actually passes
across a misaligned switch. The former is the consequence of
an improper command to the switch, the manual movement
of the switch, or a failure of the switch controller. The later
could be caused by a failure of the switch position indicator
to detect the switch position, or a failure of the wayside system
to convey the position to the train. The third is the failure of
the wayside system to provide the correct aspect to the crew.
Failures to convey the switch position correctly can be
attributed to a number of possible system faults. These include
generation of a false proceed by the wayside system or gener-
ation of a false proceed by the onboard system. False proceeds
result from a wayside system display failure that results in the
display incorrectly indicating the actual switch position to the
crew or a wayside or onboard system failure that conveys an
incorrect aspect.
The third category associated with the derailment of a train
occurs when a train is moving at a speed in excess of an appro-
priate speed for the track conditions (Fig. 4). For a train to
over speed two conditions must be met. The ﬁrst is that the
train crew are operating the train at a speed greater than
that authorized for the track and the PTC system must fail
to properly enforce the authorized speed. In order for the train
crew to operate the train at a speed greater than authorized,
either the train crew are not complying with the railroad oper-
ating rules, or the authorized speed provided to the train crew
exceeds a safe operating speed for the track conditions.
Providing a speed to the crew greater than the safe operat-
ing speed can be the result of the failure of the PTC system to
correctly display the operating speed to the crew, providing an
incorrect permanent speed restriction to the PTC system, pro-
viding an incorrect temporary speed restriction to the PTCilment failure modes.
Figure 3 Switch failure modes.
Positive Train Control (PTC) failure modes 317system, or a failure of the wayside system to convey correct
speed to the train. Invalid temporary or permanent speed
restrictions provided to the PTC system are the result of dis-
patcher error.
PTC system failures where the PTC system fails to properly
enforce the authorized speed are the consequence of a PTC
system failure itself, or a failure of the PTC system to provide
sufﬁcient braking force to de-accelerate the train. PTC systemfailures include failure to enforce a permanent speed limit, fail-
ure to enforce a temporary speed, or a failure to be able to
determine the correct speed limit due to a database error where
the correct speed limit cannot be found. Insufﬁcient braking
force to de-accelerate the train can be the result of brake sys-
tem failure or the PTC system braking characteristics being
incorrect. Brake systems are not a part of the PTC system,
although the PTC system commands when they should be
Figure 4 Over speed failure modes.
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train control system, but the locomotive control system, fur-
ther development of this failure mode will be excluded as being
more appropriate to a study of the locomotive failures. The
other cause of a failure to enforce can be the result of the sys-
tem having been provided an incorrect braking algorithm.
Failure to properly enforce temporary speed restrictions
may also be caused by failure to enter the temporary speed
restriction, entry of an incorrect temporary speed restriction,
or incorrect removal of a temporary speed restriction. These
could be caused by an error on the part of the dispatcher or
the crew, or an internal failure on the part of the PTC system
resulting in a failure to accept the speed restriction, corruption
of the speed restriction, or incorrect removal of a speed
restriction.
Both the second, traversal of switch incorrectly aligned for
train movements, and the third categories, derailment resulting
from speeds in excess of appropriate speed for track condi-
tions, share a common cause, which are not associated with
any failure of the PTC subsystem. The act of the crew securing
power to the onboard PTC system, maintenance personnel
securing power to wayside units, or ofﬁce personnel securing
power to the ofﬁce system result in the inability for the PTC
system to operate. The act of securing power to a PTC system
component may be a consequence of an operator error or the
actions of a mal-actor. Hence a failure may not only be a
safety issue, but a security issue as well.
The fourth subcategory is derailment as a consequence of a
collision.
5.4.2. Collisions
Train collisions can be head end to head end between trains on
the same track, head end to rear end collisions on the same
track, or side collisions between trains on conﬂicting routes
(Fig. 5). Each is the consequence of three different possible
events: failures to establish correct routes, failure to enforceroutes, or trains over speeding for the track conditions result-
ing in overrunning limits of authority. The underlying causes
for a train over speed have been discussed earlier in conjunc-
tion with derailments. The causes of a failure to establish cor-
rect routes and failure to enforce correct routes are common
regardless if they result in a head end to head end, head end
to rear end, or side collisions.
Route selection failures can be attributed to failure of the
PTC wayside equipment to generate the correct routing
signals, or failure of existing wayside equipment allowing
unsafe train movement. Collisions arising from failure of
wayside equipment, which allow an unsafe movement, can
be the result of the failure of the PTC system to correctly
display the route to the crew, the ofﬁce dispatch system pro-
viding an incorrect route to the PTC system, or a failure of
the wayside system to convey the correct route to the train.
Failures to enforce a correct route can be attributed to
failure of the wayside equipment to execute the correct com-
mands to protect against conﬂicting routes, or failure of the
PTC system to enforce commands that prevent conﬂicting
routes.
PTC system failures that prevent enforcement against con-
ﬂicting results could include failure of the PTC system to re-
ceive the correct route from the wayside or ofﬁce, failure of
the PTC system to generate appropriate braking commands
to protect received routes, or failure of the braking system to
properly implement the braking commands.
Train collisions are not necessarily with other trains. Trains
can collide with maintenance personnel conducting track re-
pairs, hay-rail vehicles operating on the track, train collisions
at highway grade crossings, collisions with individuals
trespassing across the track, collisions with other objects that
have fallen onto the tracks, and collisions with end of track
protection devices. Collisions with maintenance personal are
the result of an unauthorized incursion into the work zone
by the train, or maintenance personnel working outside the
Figure 5 Collision failure modes.
Positive Train Control (PTC) failure modes 319limits of their authority. Causes of unauthorized incursions by
the train into the work zone are the same as the causes associ-
ated with train-to-train collisions. Maintenance personnelworking outside the limits of their authority can be attributed
to various human factor issues that are not a result of a PTC
system failure and, therefore, are outside the scope of this
320 M. Hartong et al.paper. Collisions with hay-rail vehicles operating on track can
be the result of issues with the PTC system, also similar to
those associated with train-to-train collisions, or the hay-rail
vehicle operating outside the limits of its authority. Like train
collisions with maintenance personnel, operations of the hay-
rail vehicle outside the limits of authority can be attributed
to various human factors that are outside the scope of this
paper.
Collisions with trespassers by a train are not considered
PTC preventable accidents. A person trespassing on railroad
property onto the tracks is currently not detectable. As a con-
sequence the PTC system is unable to provide either predictive
or reactive braking to avoid collision. What causes persons to
trespass is not fully understood, and is a subject of active re-
search ( FRA, 2007, 2008), and is outside the scope of this
paper.
Train collisions at highway grade crossings are attributable
to three separate causes, two of which are well understood, and
one that is not. The causes that are understood are a conse-
quence of a failure of the PTC system that has the capability
to arm the crossing before the train reaches the crossing, or
a failure in the operation of the grade crossing. However the
third cause, incursion of drivers into a properly operating
and activated crossing is not. As with trespassers, the rationale
for the driver’s actions is a subject of active research, and sim-
ilarly is outside the scope of this paper.
Collisions with other objects that have fallen onto the
tracks are also usually not preventable by PTC systems. Some
may be ‘‘Acts of God’’, where objects such as trees disturbed
by weather or rocks are displaced as a consequence of erosion.
Others may be the result of actions by mal-actors placing items
on track to induce a collision and a subsequent derailment. In
advanced Levels 3 and 4 PTC systems, slide fences that can de-
tect the accidental incursion may be linked into the PTC sys-
tem and, provided that the PTC system does not otherwise
fail, may be able to prevent collisions.
The ﬁnal category of collisions may be the consequence of a
train exceeding the limits of its authority and interacting with
end of track protection devices. These include bumpers placed
at the absolute physical end of track devices, or derails placed
on a track to create a virtual end of track. Causes for collisions
of the ﬁrst type, as well as the second type, are the same as
those associated with train-to-train collisions.
6. Summary and future work
The safety of PTC systems in the United States is governed by
extensive federal regulations, compliance with which must be
demonstrated before a railroad may place any PTC system into
revenue service. A critical element of these regulations is the
requirement that a railroad perform a detailed quantitative
analysis comparing the risks before, and after, the installation
of the PTC system. We have described a minimal set of conse-
quences associatedwith system failure and their implementation
independent causal factors that provide system designers a base-
line that can be extended with the implementation dependent
causal factors, facilitating accomplishment of the required com-
parative analysis. The use of a common baseline not only en-
ables a more rapid analysis and review of these systems by
vendors, railroads, and the government, but also simpliﬁes com-
parisons of different system.Extension of the baseline to deﬁne common failure modes
between differing implementations can further facilitate system
comparisons. This work, however, requires access to detailed
proprietary system design information from the various PTC
system suppliers. It is further complicated by the need to
ensure that the analysis results do not disclose the details of
any speciﬁc vendors proprietary information to their
competitors.
Another critical area of research is the derivation of the
appropriate FFT from the system speciﬁcations. We believe
integrating UML Use Cases (OMG, 2005) with Misuse Cases
(Opdahl andSindre, 2001; Alexander, 2002) that are commonly
used to capture functional requirements with FFT speciﬁcation
and analysis provides an integrated method to identify details
of failure modes as well as how safety and security objectives
are met both quantitatively and qualitatively. The equivalency
of FFTs and the UML notation has been suggested
(Bitsch, 2002; Hawkins et al., 2003). However, additional study
and formalization of Use–Misuse Case and FFT equivalency
language as well as automation of the translation process is re-
quired to fully exploit the potential advantages of this tech-
nique. Formalization of causal factors affecting safety and
security, and their integration, is a subject of our ongoing
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